'This is an excellent book. It addresses what, in both conceptual and political terms, is arguably the most important source of tension and confusion in current arguments about the environment, namely the concept of nature; and it does so in a way that is both sensitive to, and critical of, the two antithetical ways of understanding this that dominate existing discussions.' Russell Keat, University of Edinburgh.

"Why, in present-day French writing, are we most likely to encounter the word "humanist" only as a term of glib dismissal? In this introduction to the controversy over "humanism", Kate Soper explains how the argument (developed by existentialists and Marxist humanists), that human experience and action play a fundamental role in "making history", has fallen into disrepute. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' shows how the "humanist" standpoint emerged in the post-war period, out of a convergence of arguments derived from Hegel, Marx, (...) Husserl, and Heidegger, then traces its elaboration within existentialism and Marxism, and finally examines the "anti-humanist" reaction in the works of Lèvi-Strauss, Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, and Derrida. Soper clearly explains what is at stake in the debate between "humanists" and "anti-humanists", and contends that this can be understood only in the context of Cold War politics and the crisis for Marxism presented by Stalinism. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' is written from a position of critical sympathy with "humanism" and is aimed chiefly at readers with no previous knowledge of Continental philosophy." -- book cover. (shrink)

Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience to that of deference. The popular view that law claims authority but does not have it is here reversed on both counts: law does not claim authority but has it. Though the focus is on political obligation, the author approaches that issue indirectly by first developing a more general account of when deference is due to the view of (...) others. Two standard practices that political theorists often consider in exploring the question of political obligation - fair-play and promise-keeping - can themselves be seen as examples of a duty of deference. In this respect the book defends a more general theory of ethics whose scope extends beyond the question of political obligation to questions of duty in the case of law, promises, fair play and friendship. (shrink)

The food sovereignty movement calls for a reversal of the neoliberal globalization of food, toward an alternative development model that supports peasant production for local consumption. The movement holds an ambiguous stance on peasant production for export markets, and clearly prioritizes localized trade. Food sovereignty discourse often simplifies and romanticizes the peasantry—overlooking agrarian class categories and ignoring the interests of export-oriented peasants. Drawing on 8 months of participant observation in the Andean countryside and 85 interviews with indigenous peasant farmers, this (...) paper finds that export markets are viewed as more fair than local markets. The indigenous peasants in this study prefer export trade because it offers a more stable and viable livelihood. Feeding the national population through local market intermediaries, by contrast, is perceived as unfair because of oversupply and low, fluctuating prices. This perspective, from the ground, offers important insight to movement actors and scholars who risk oversimplifying peasant values, interests, and actions. (shrink)

Psychoanalytic Complexity is the application of a multidisciplinary, explanatory theory to clinical psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. It carries with it incisive and pivotal attitudes that aim to transform our understanding of therapeutic action and the change process. Here, William Coburn offers a revolutionary and far-reaching counterpoint to the remnants of Cartesianism and scientism, respecting and encouraging human anomaly rather than pathologizing or obliterating the uniqueness of the individual person. In Psychoanaltyic Complexity, William Coburn explores the value of complexity theory (...) previously understood as an explanatory framework with which clinicians can better understand, retrospectively, therapeutic action and the change process. He further extends this sensibility by examining the ways in which such a rich theoretical framework can inform what clinicians can do, prospectively, to effect positive change within the therapeutic relationship. He persuasively argues that the medium of bringing to light new ways of relating, emotional experiencing, and meaning making resides in the fundamental attitudes derived from a complexity theory sensibility as applied to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Using a variety of clinical illustrations throughout, Psychoanalytic Complexity is a radical corrective to reductionism and the more traditional presumption that the problem lies with the patient and the cure lies with the therapist. It offers a new language, vocabulary, way of thinking, and a new way of being with others that are pivotal in arriving at affirmative therapeutic change. This book is intended for psychoanalysts, clinical psychologists, therapists, mental health counsellors, academics and teachers who are interested in new trends in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. (shrink)

I. INTRODUCTION Twenty-five years is roughly the time that has elapsed since the exchange between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller and the subsequent revival in this country of the natural law/positivism debate. During this time, a curious thing has happened to legal positivism. What began as a conceptual theory about the distinction between law and morality has now been turned, at least by some, into a moral theory. According to this theory, the reason we must see law and (...) morality as separate is not because of the logic of our language, but because of the practical implications of holding one or the other of the two traditional views in this area. The natural law theorist, it is said, can connect law and morality only at the cost of investing official directives with undeserved moral authority, thus encouraging obedience where there should be none. The natural law position should therefore be rejected – and the positivist's accepted – on moral grounds. (shrink)

Because organic certification standards institutionalized a product-based rather than process-based definition, certified organic produce can be grown on large-scale industrial monocrop farms. Besides toxicity of inputs, these farms operate in much the same way as conventional production. Scholars emphasize the fact that labor rights have been left out of certification criteria, and because of that, organic farms reproduce the same labor relations as conventional. Empirical studies of organic farm labor, however, rely primarily on the perspective of farmers. In this study, (...) I ask the farmworkers themselves how harvesting on organic farms compares to conventional, and found that working in organic negatively impacts farmworker livelihoods. Qualitative interviews with 36 strawberry harvesters in Oxnard, California reveal that farmworkers make more money in conventional strawberry production because of the interaction between wage structure and size of the berry. Conventional strawberries are larger and therefore fewer of them fill up a box. Farmworkers routinely pick more boxes in conventional than in organic, thus earning more, since under the piece rate system, farmworkers are paid per box. With short-term economic survival rather than long-term occupational health concerns in mind, strawberry harvesters would rather work on conventional farms because “la fresa orgánica es más chiquita”. (shrink)

This book presents a theory about the kind of thing a mind is and, on the basis of this theory, a view about how minds are individuated and when two mental states belong to the same mind.

This book was written primarily as a contribution to the field, but its plan excellently suits it for use as a text in courses in metaphysics, types of ...

This paper begins with an explanation of why, despite their obscurity, Tillich’s writings have been attractive to a wide audience. I then describe some of the main features of his mature theological position and discuss a number of the central questions and difficulties to which this position gives rise. The discussion focuses on such questions as whether Tillich can justify holding his own “interpretations” of traditional Christian ideas to have a privileged status, whether the deliteralization of traditional Christian language is (...) compatible with the idea that Christianity is a historical religion, how we are to understand Tillich’s notion of a symbolic or mythological account’s being adequate to revelatory experience, what it is for a “practical interpretation” of revelatory experience to be an adequate expression of such experience, and what is the best way of handling the problems raised by TiIlich’s claim that there are no literally true statements---or only one literally true statement---about God. (shrink)

“The human other, each singular and whole in its own right, is never the same but always a different person. Human beings don’t repeat each other; they contradict each other” (Goldschmidt, Contradiction Set Free). Originally published in German in 1976, in the long shadow of the Shoah, in response to the threat of atomic holocaust, and amidst growing recognition of ecological disaster, Goldschmidt’s Contradiction Set Free argues that emancipation lies in diversity rather than in unity, in the freeing up of (...) contradiction rather than in uniformity. I offer a close reading of Goldschmidt’s plea for pluralism, the foundation for our inescapable moral and political responsibilities to others. Today, what insights—and what hope—does his dialogic offer for the “joyfully creative” realization of our responsibilities to the other, both human and in the natural world? (shrink)

What are the ethics of using voices generated by artificial intelligence or “deepfake” technology in documentary film? This case study explores the controversy surrounding the use of AI to reconstruct Anthony Bourdain’s voice in the biographical film, Roadrunner.

People can look at non-conforming behaviour in two ways: either the person is acting immorally or the moral theory that condemns the behaviour is mistaken. To choose the former is to reflect a confidence in the existing moral theory, while choosing the latter is evidence that moral theory for that particular behaviour is wrong. This point says a lot about the link between the descriptive and evaluative enterprises of law. The development of basic moral principles, which draws from moral intuition, (...) is a similar process when it comes to developing social practices, which in turn draw from human behaviour. Legal positivism has contributed much to clarifying the kind of social facts that characterize legal systems, specifically the kind of normative claims that legal systems typically make. Legal positivism provides much of the descriptive front. This chapter is motivated by an interest in reconciling the normative claims of law with the claims that moral philosophers believe can be justified. (shrink)

One of the recurrent temptations in theory of knowledge is to try to provide an inductive justification for employing the principles of inductive inference. The purpose of the present paper is to suggest that this approach is misguided by exposing the deficiencies of what appears to be the most carefully constructed attempt of this kind which has thus far been made. I refer to the attempt made by R. B. Braithwaite in his Scientific Explanation.

The account of belief adumbrated by Ryle in The Concept of Mind is, I think, a very tempting one despite its relative vagueness. According to this account, a belief that such and such is the case is a disposition of a certain kind. More specifically, it is a tendency or a propensity to behave and to react in more or less definite ways under certain circumstances. Thus “to believe that the ice is dangerously thin,” Ryle writes, “is to be unhesitant (...) in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people's assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition,. and so forth.” Moreover, he continues, “it is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to warn other skaters.” In short, to believe that p is to have “a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings.”. (shrink)